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Abstract 
This article investigates how and provides tentative explanations of why reputation and 
crisis management—defined as two different yet not incompatible sets of ideas stemming 
from the same institutional logic—have been institutionalized in the public sector in 
Denmark. More specifically, we examine whether reputation and crisis management 
become integrated (coupling) or not (decoupling) as disciplines after having being intro-
duced to the individual organizations. The empirical context is the organizational field of 
Danish municipalities. Based on both quantitative and qualitative data, including, an elite 
survey conducted among administrative actors from the municipalities and communica-
tion plans, the analysis found that although reputation and crisis management per se are 
widely disseminated within the field, they are neither entirely institutionalized nor strong-
ly coupled. 
 
Introduction 
The fact that public organizations are confronted by complex environments gen-
erating conflicting expectations and demands is a long-accepted fact within the 
literature on public administration (Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Rainey & Chun, 
2005) and organizational institutionalism (Christensen, Lægreid, Roness & 
Røvik, 2007). In the latter approach, such complexity has been identified as 
institutional complexity, which materializes as situations where organizations are 
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confronted with incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). 
A growing interest in institutional complexity has led to a substantial body 
of research on how organizations experience and respond to institutional com-
plexity (for an overview, see Greenwood et al., 2011). However, the bulk of this 
research has been conducted as diachronic studies of how one dominant institu-
tional logic is replaced by another over time. Synchronic studies of how organi-
zations handle situations where the same institutional logic materializes as a 
number of different, yet not incompatible management ideas (Røvik, 2007), 
which organizations may institutionalize at one and the same time, are rare, 
albeit this is indeed often the situation confronting public managers today. This 
article aspires to fill this gap, investigating how two sets of new management 
ideas (reputation and crisis management) representing the same new institutional 
logic (the logic of the communicative organization and the symbolic ‘market-
place’) become institutionalized in Danish municipalities. 
The reputation of a public organization may be defined as “the set of beliefs 
about an organization’s capacities, intentions, history and mission that are em-
bedded in a network of multiple audiences” (Carpenter, 2010a: 34; Carpenter & 
Krause, 2012: 26; for a criticism of Carpenter’s approach, see Maor, forthcom-
ing). Inspired by Rindova and Martins’ (2012) multidimensional view of reputa-
tion, we see these beliefs as the outcome of the interpretation of information 
stemming from various sources located within the organizational field or in 
society at large, i.e. the public organizations themselves, their stakeholders, and 
institutional intermediaries such as the media and various ranking organizations, 
who’s positioning and portrayal of public organizations play a vital role for how 
they are perceived. 
Existing within an environment characterized by the ubiquity of crisis, 
blame games and mediatization (Boin et al., 2005; Hood, 2002, 2011), the repu-
tations of public organizations are constantly subjected to threats. Reputational 
threats may be defined as incidents that shed a negative light on an organiza-
tion’s reputation, often transmitted as negative media coverage (Gilad et al., 
2013; Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013), possibly resulting in a crisis for the 
organization (Coombs, 2015). 
Responding to such threats, Danish municipalities have adopted reputational 
strategies (Salomonsen & Nielsen, forthcoming) and strategies aimed at manag-
ing and communicating during crisis (Frandsen & Johansen, 2009). However, 
whether this emerging awareness of reputational and crisis issues is institutional-
ized within the municipalities leading to a coupling of the ideas of reputation and 
crisis management or whether the two sets of ideas live their own autonomous 
lives decoupled from each other remains an unanswered question. Based upon an 
institutional perspective, this article aims to address this question1. 
In order to do so, we begin by reviewing the literature on reputation and cri-
sis management, primarily in the Scandinavian context. We then briefly describe 
our theoretical framework, ending this section by posing a series of specific 
research questions. The research design and methods are introduced before the 
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empirical analysis is presented. The article concludes with a discussion of our 
findings. 
 
Literature review 
Although research on reputation and crisis management within the public sector 
is increasing, existing studies primarily investigate the two sets of management 
ideas separately. 
Research in public sector reputation and reputation management in the 
Scandinavian countries includes both contributions aimed at contextualizing 
generic theories on reputation management in the context of the public sector as 
well as empirical investigations of reputation management within the health care 
sector (Blomgren, Hedmo & Waks, forthcoming; Byrkjeflot & Angell, 2008; 
Solbakk, 2011; Sataøen, 2011; Wæraas & Sataøen, 2013), central government 
organizations (Luoma-aho, 2007; Wæraas, 2013), courts of law (Moldenæs, 
2011), and municipalities. Regarding the theoretical contributions, Byrkjeflot 
and Wæraas have published extensively on the challenges of practicing reputa-
tion management within the public sector due to the distinctiveness of the politi-
cal management of public organizations, the normative context, and the traits 
characterizing many public organizations (Byrkjeflot, 2010; Wæraas & 
Byrkjeflot, 2012; Wæraas, Byrkjeflot & Angell, 2011; see also Wæraas & Maor, 
forthcoming). 
Empirical investigations include the identification of a reputation paradox 
reflected as challenges for Norwegian municipalities when cultivating a unique 
reputation, thereby differentiating themselves from the organizational field of 
municipalities (Wæraas & Bjørnå, 2011). Somehow related, Wæraas (forthcom-
ing) identifies the awareness of the existence of a reputation commons in Nor-
wegian municipalities belonging to the same region. Contributions have also 
investigated the variety of stakeholders targeted in the reputation strategies of 
Norwegian municipalities and the strategic goals being pursued (Bjørnå, forth-
coming). Concerning reputation strategies, Wæraas, Bjørnå and Moldenæs 
(2014) have identified the types of branding strategies used by Norwegian mu-
nicipalities, discovering that most of them use an organizational strategy in favor 
of a place and democracy strategy. 
While these contributions all share what Wæraas and Maor (forthcoming) 
identify as an organizational perspective on reputation, emphasizing “how public 
entities cope with the challenges of reputation and how they develop explicit 
strategies for doing it,” Salomonsen and Nielsen (forthcoming) have taken a 
political science perspective in their investigation of the politics of reputation 
management in Danish municipalities. Based upon a premise of public sector 
organizations being politically conscious organizations as well as arenas for 
political conflict and rivalry between politicians and between the politicians and 
the administration, however, they demonstrate that, in the municipal context, 
reputation management involves a low degree of conflict and disagreement be-
tween those actors despite both top civil servants and the mayor being involved 
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in such strategic management. Finally, Nielsen and Salomonsen (2012) have 
investigated the institutional pressures for performing strategic communication, 
including both reputation and crisis management in Danish municipalities. 
Research in public sector crisis management in the Scandinavian countries 
has developed over time. Early research focused on emergency management 
with special reference to the role of the media and the communication strategies 
applied by the public authorities in disastrous situations. Recent research has a 
much broader approach, investigating, among other things, crisis communication 
to multicultural publics in cities (Falkheimer & Heide, 2006) and internal crisis 
communication in Danish municipalities (Johansen, Aggerholm & Frandsen, 
2012) and Swedish hospitals (Heide & Simonsson, 2014) (for an overview of 
crisis research in Scandinavia, see Frandsen & Johansen, 2015). 
In 2003, a Danish study of crisis preparedness revealed that public and pri-
vate organizations perceive and practice crisis management differently (Frandsen 
& Johansen, 2004). The municipalities primarily perceived terrorism, bomb 
threats, accidents involving injuries and environmental pollution as threats, 
whereas private companies also included product recalls and negative media 
coverage. The municipalities perceived political problems and damages to their 
reputation among the general public to be the most important consequences of a 
crisis. In 2011, a similar study, including a stronger focus on internal crisis pre-
paredness, revealed that the municipalities also have their own approach to in-
ternal crisis management, an approach distinctly different from that of private 
companies (Johansen, Aggerholm & Frandsen, 2012). 
Concerning the relationship between reputation and crisis management, 
Frandsen and Johansen’s (2009) explorative study of the institutionalization of 
crisis communication in Danish municipalities identified how two different insti-
tutional logics operate behind the municipal crisis preparedness systems: (1) a 
traditional emergency management logic, represented by the emergency officers, 
which focuses on citizen safety; and 2) a new crisis management logic, repre-
sented by the chief communication officers, which focuses on the reputation of 
the municipalities. At the time of the study, these two logics existed in ‘separate 
worlds’ with little interaction. Frandsen and Johansen (2013) turned the investi-
gation of these two institutional logics into a more comprehensive study of the 
interaction between emergency management plans and crisis management plans 
in municipalities, discovering that the reputation concept has now also entered 
the vocabulary of the emergency management logic. Looking beyond the Scan-
dinavian context, we find Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan’s (2014) study of how an 
Australian service delivery agency’s priority to crisis management (vis-à-vis 
output) when confronted by a crisis threatening its reputation is contingent upon 
its perception of past performance prior to the crisis. 
 
Theoretical framework 
In our efforts to describe and provide some tentative explanations concerning 
how and why Danish municipalities have institutionalized reputation and crisis 
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management as has been the case thus far, we have chosen to apply organiza-
tional institutionalism as our overall theoretical framework (Greenwood, Oliver, 
Sahlin & Suddaby, 2008). Essentially, neo-institutional theory is a theory about 
organizations, their environments, and how these environments in the shape of 
institutions penetrate, constrain and change the organizations (Scott, 2008). 
Recently, there has been a growing interest among organizational scholars to 
study institutional complexity; that is, how organizations experience and respond 
to “incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics” (Greenwood et 
al., 2011: 317). The institutional logics perspective has been instrumental in this 
development. In their landmark article, Friedland and Alford (1991) described 
society as an inter-institutional system in which each institution is associated 
with a specific institutional logic. Thus, society is constituted through a multi-
tude of interdependent yet also contradictory logics. Thornton and Ocasio (2008) 
defined an institutional logic as the socially constructed, historical patterns of 
cultural symbols and material practices, including assumptions, values and be-
liefs, by which individuals and organizations provide meaning to their daily 
activities, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives and experiences. 
In accordance with this perspective, we define the adoption of reputation and 
crisis management by Danish municipalities as a process of institutionalization, 
which, as becomes evident in the analysis below, starts in the mid-2000s. Simi-
larly, we define the disciplines of reputation and crisis management as two sets 
of institutional ideas about how to manage, organize and communicate if an 
organization wants to establish and maintain a favorable reputation among its 
key stakeholders and/or handle a crisis. 
Greenwood et al. (2011) describe the prototypical study of institutional 
complexity as that of how one dominant institutional logic is replaced by another 
during a period of transition. The two institutional logics are viewed as incom-
patible, and the shift from one logic to another eliminates the complexity gener-
ated within the organizations by this incompability. Finally, the prototypical 
study is mostly a horizontal field-level study leaving out the vertical nestedness 
of logics. 
The present study differs from this description in two important ways: First, 
the institutional complexity under study is of a different kind. Reputation and 
crisis management represent two different sets of management ideas. However, 
the fact that they are different does not mean that they are also incompatible; on 
the contrary, we see them as belonging to one and the same institutional logic: 
the logic of the communicative organization and the symbolic ‘marketplace’. It 
is not a question of competing recipies; the two sets of ideas are members of the 
same family (Røvik, 1998). Second, we take a synchronic—not diachronic—
perspective on the institutionalization of reputation and crisis management. 
Our approach to institutional theory emerges from our understanding of or-
ganizational fields. To move away from an understanding of organizational 
fields as containers or static sets of boundaries, we adopt Wooten and Hoffman’s 
(2008, p. 138) definition of organizational fields as dynamic “relational spaces 
that provide an organization with the opportunity to involve itself with other 
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actors.” This new approach to organizational fields has numerous advantages. 
First, it is based on an idea of organizational fields as mechanisms for bringing 
about phenomena other than similarity (e.g., organizational identity). Second, it 
focuses on field-level processes that hold field members together, and not just on 
field-level outcomes. Finally, it also has a strong focus on the interactions be-
tween actors, and not just on diffusion. 
 We have found it necessary to expand the vocabulary of neo-
institutional theory by adding a new distinction, namely that between external 
and internal decoupling. Whereas studies of decoupling traditionally address the 
question of the relation between formal structures and actual behavior (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977) or talk and action (Brunsson, 2002)—that which we will refer to 
as external decoupling—we investigate the extent to which reputation and crisis 
strategies and concerns addressing the same potential challenge, that is reputa-
tional threats, but representing two different sets of ideas are coupled or subject 
to what we refer to as internal decoupling, which is institutionalized within the 
municipalities as two distinct strategies and aimed at different types of audienc-
es. 
The coupling or decoupling of ideas may be reflected in different institu-
tional dimensions: formally in different types of plans and policies, normatively 
in organizational prescriptions of what is considered appropriate behavior, and 
cognitively in what is recognized as legitimate and taken for granted (Scott, 
2008). To identify the degree of coupling vis-à-vis decoupling between reputa-
tion and crisis management in the different institutional dimensions, the article 
investigates a number of specific research questions. 
One indication of a coupling of crisis and reputational concerns reflecting 
both a formal and potential cognitive institutional dimension is whether the repu-
tational strategies reflect how the municipalities identify an intimate relation 
between crisis and reputation. Therefore, we ask: 
 
• RQ(1): Is preparation for a potential crisis a central element 
in the municipal reputational strategies? And are reputation-
al concerns a central element in their crisis communication 
strategies? 
 
Due to the complexity of public organization environments, their reputation is 
based on the perceptions of multiple stakeholders (Carpenter, 2010b: 34, 58–59; 
Carpenter & Krause, 2012: 27–28), which for municipalities include the central 
government, the media, interest organizations, employees, citizens, other munic-
ipalities and so forth. The media in particular appears to play a crucial yet com-
plicating role. They communicate their own opinions but also act as an institu-
tional intermediary or stakeholder by proxy, serving as the channel through 
which multiple stakeholders can communicate about how they perceive an or-
ganization’s reputation (Boin et al., 2005: 72; Coombs, 2007: 164) as well as the 
media, from which many stakeholders gather the information upon which they 
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form their opinion of any given organization and its reputation. Some scholars 
even suggest a distinct “media reputation” for modern organizations 
(Deephouse, 2000). Hence, the media may be of paramount importance during a 
crisis, as argued by Coombs (2012): “When stakeholder process media reports 
and other information about a crisis, that crisis information becomes part of the 
indirect experience used to construct a corporate reputation” (p. 271). This leads 
us to ask: 
• RQ(2): To what type of stakeholders do municipalities find 
it important to communicate as reflected in their reputation 
and/or crisis communication strategies? Is the media consid-
ered central? 
 
In order to further investigate the degree of integration reflected in the institu-
tionalization of reputation and crisis management, we ask: 
 
• RQ(3): Do municipalities that find it important to prepare 
themselves for potential crises as part of their reputational 
strategies formulate explicit crisis communication plans 
more often than those that do not have crisis preparation as a 
central purpose? 
 
This would reflect integration at the formal institutional level. 
In a more normative vein, we also argue that the type of crisis management 
described in the strategies indicates the degree of normative and cognitive insti-
tutional dimensions of a coupling of reputational and crisis concerns. The per-
formance of crisis management deeply depends on the perception of a crisis: (1) 
as an unpredictable negative event, which is to be accommodated by a reactive 
“damage control” type of management; or (2) as a dynamic process (including 
the phases before, during and after the crisis), which demands the continuous 
(re)assessments of the crisis and monitoring and dialogue with a variety of 
stakeholders. Furthermore, a dynamic—and hence proactive—approach 
acknowledges that indications ex ante the crisis are possible to detect and that 
learning ex post the crisis is as important as handling the crisis as it unfolds 
(Frandsen & Johansen, 2013: 172; Johansen & Frandsen, 2007: 109). 
Another central characteristic of this process-oriented view is its strategic 
approach to crisis management, where the handling of a crisis is explicitly relat-
ed to other important organizational goals and strategies, including the organiza-
tional reputation (Frandsen & Johansen, 2013: 172). The process orientation is 
further reflected in the development of ex ante risk assessments, stakeholder 
analyses, crisis communication strategies and plans for coordinating both re-
sponses and communication during and after a crisis. Based upon this distinc-
tion, we argue that a strategic, proactive and process-oriented approach to crisis 
management reflects an institutional integration and coupling of crisis and repu-
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tational concerns in contrast to a more event-oriented approach. Therefore, we 
ask: 
• RQ(4): Do municipalities have a process rather than an 
event-oriented approach to crises as reflected in their crisis 
communication plans? 
 
Municipalities are multifunctional organizations (Frandsen & Johansen, 2009: 
105) with multiple identities by default (Wæraas, 2008); hence, the general wis-
dom that public organizations have multiple reputations (Carpenter & Krause, 
2012) is indeed the case for municipalities as well. The multifunctional and 
multiple identities of municipalities are reflected in the fact that they are local 
democracies governed by elected politicians. They are, however, also part of a 
multi-level public governance structure in which they are administrative and 
implementing bodies serving the central government. And, finally, they are “or-
ganizations” in an institutional sense. As such, municipalities have increasingly 
defined themselves as corporate organizations (Salomonsen, 2011) with “clearly 
defined boundaries and jurisdictions and organizational identities” (Wæraas, 
Bjørnå & Moldenæs, 2014). These multiple identities can be reflected within the 
multiple reputations of public organizations. 
As argued by Carpenter and Krause (2012: 27), public organizations have 
multifaceted reputations, including (at least) four dimensions: (1) performative, 
the ability to execute its tasks competently and efficiently (Carpenter, 2010a: 
46); (2) moral, the capacity to meet the normative expectations posed to public 
organizations, such as protecting citizens and ensuring transparency; (3) tech-
nical, which depends on the “expertise” and professional qualifications of the 
organization; and (4) procedural, which refers to the extent that the organiza-
tional performance conforms with set procedures and legislation (Carpenter, 
2010a: 45–46). Related to the identity dimensions discussed above, municipali-
ties as local democracies may be concerned about their moral reputation; munic-
ipalities as administrative bodies may be concerned about their procedural repu-
tation; and municipalities as corporations may be concerned about their per-
formative and technical reputation. In order to provide a first insight into the 
“type” of municipality that couples crisis and reputation management, we ask: 
 
• RQ(5): In the municipalities in which preparing for potential 
crises is a central element in the reputational strategies, 
which type of identity and reputational dimension is central 
to the reputational strategies? 
 
Research design and methods 
The empirical analysis is based on a cross-sectional design, including quantita-
tive survey data collected at a single point in time (Bryman, 2004: 41) combined 
with a more qualitative analysis of formal crisis communication strategies. 
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The survey data includes a survey sent to all of the mayors of the 98 Danish 
municipalities, all of the chief administrative officers (the municipal CAO being 
the highest appointed administrator), and the persons responsible for strategic 
communication. The questionnaire was submitted electronically using Survey 
Xact®. All of the target respondents received an email in which they were in-
formed about the project together with a link to an online survey. 
The complete details of the survey questions are available from the authors 
upon request. We used a 5-point Likert scale to reflect the respondent’s level of 
agreement/disagreement with most of the questions. To promote the efficiency 
and ensure the construct validity of the questions (de Vaus, 2002: 96), communi-
cation managers from two municipalities tested the questionnaire and provided 
feedback regarding its content and structure before it was distributed. 
The survey data was primarily collected from May to June, 2013. To in-
crease the response rate, we emailed a number of reminders and eventually made 
telephone calls to the respondents in June 2013 and again in February and March 
2014. We merged the three sets of answers to the questionnaires according to the 
following principle: If there was a person responsible for strategic communica-
tion, we included their answers; if not, we included the answer from the CAO; if 
neither of them had responded to the questionnaire, we included the mayor. 
Priority was given to the persons responsible for strategic communication (e.g. 
communication directors, communication consultants) due to the subject of our 
inquiry and the vital role these persons play in developing reputational and crisis 
communication strategies (Salomonsen and Nielsen, forthcoming). Overall, we 
reached an 79.6% response rate (n = 79, including 7 mayors, 18 CAOs and 53 
persons responsible for strategic communication), although for some of the ques-
tions it falls to around 50%. 
The survey data is analyzed as simple frequencies or correlations. Due to the 
ordinal character of the data, we have used a Gamma test for the latter (Hansen 
& Hansen, 2012: 380). The Gamma correlation coefficient can be used to inter-
pret the strengths and direction of the relationship between two variables (Han-
sen and Hansen 2012: 380). The correlation coefficient has been interpreted as 
recommended by de Vaus (2002: 272). 
The documents consist of crisis communication plans (in some cases includ-
ed in a more general communication strategy) and emergency plans collected in 
April and May 2014. Most of the documents do not explicitly refer to policies, 
strategies or plans in their headings (13). If there was a reference in the title, 
however, plan (6) and policy (4) was the preferred choice. All of the 53 respond-
ents who have stated that their municipality had a crisis communication plan 
were contacted by e-mail or telephone in order to collect the documents. We 
were able to establish contact to 36 of the 53 municipalities. From them, we 
received 23 crisis communication plans, four of which are a part of a more gen-
eral communication strategy; the rest had no such plan after all or merely an 
emergency plan. The emergency plans are not included, as they are merely a 
legally required document, a plan that all municipalities must have (The Danish 
Emergency Act, §25, chapter 5). Hence, such plans are more about fulfilling 
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legal requirements than strategic reflections on how to manage and communicate 
during crisis. 
The documents have primarily been subject to qualitative analysis. In order 
to identify the type of crisis management reflected in the communication plans, 
we used the codebook included in Appendix A. The coding is inspired by Johan-
sen and Frandsen’s (2007) definition of a strategic, proactive and process-
oriented approach to crisis management together with their study of emergency 
management plans and crisis management plans (Frandsen & Johansen, 2013). 
The coding is performed in order to identify the degree to which the different 
dimensions of a process approach to crisis management are reflected in the strat-
egies. As some of the municipalities requested anonymity, we have anonymized 
all of the quotes. 
 
Findings 
Various types of strategic communication have been a central concern for Dan-
ish municipalities at least since 2007, when extensive reform reduced the num-
ber of municipalities from 279 to 98. This is also reflected in Table 1, which 
shows that the number of municipalities that begin working strategically with 
their reputation increased radically around 2006–07.  
 
Table 1. The year Danish municipalities began working strategically with their 
reputation 
Year  Frequency  Valid % 
2000 or before 7  
2002 1  
2005 1  
2006 7  
2007 14  
2008 7  
2009 4  
2010 5  
2011 6  
2012 6  
2013 1  
Total 
Missing 
Total  
59 
29 
98 
100 
 
This tendency to devote attention to strategic reputation management has contin-
ued and, as reflected in Table 2, 87% of the municipalities included in the analy-
sis are somehow working strategically with their reputation. Furthermore, as 
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reflected in Table 3, 79% state that they have a strategy for communication dur-
ing crisis.  
 
Table 2. Reputation strategies in Danish municipalities 
 Frequency  Valid %  
The municipality has a 
specific reputation strategy 
19 28 
The municipality has a 
reputation strategy as part 
of a general communica-
tion strategy 
11 16 
The municipality has no 
reputation strategy but it 
works strategically with its 
reputation anyway 
29 43 
The municipality has no 
reputation strategy  
5 7 
Others  4 6 
Total  
Missing  
Total   
68 
30 
98 
100 
 
Table 3. Crisis communication strategies in Danish municipalities 
 Frequency  Valid % 
The municipality has a 
specific crisis communica-
tion strategy 
55 79 
The municipality has no 
specific crisis communica-
tion strategy  
15 21 
Total 
Missing 
Total 
70 
28 
98 
100 
 
A first indication of whether this substantial concern for strategic reputation 
management and the management of crisis communication is coupled in the 
respective strategies is illustrated in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 4. Central elements in the reputation strategies 
 To a 
very 
high 
de-
gree  
To a 
high 
de-
gree 
To 
some 
degree  
To a 
low 
de-
gree  
To a 
very 
low 
de-
gree  
Total Miss
-ing 
Total  
Increase the 
population  
44* 
(58)
** 
21 
(28) 
9 
(12) 
2 
(3) 
0 76 22 98 
Improve the 
reputation of 
the municipali-
ty held by 
important 
stakeholders  
26 
(35) 
28 
(37) 
17 
(23) 
3 
(4) 
1 
(1) 
75 
 
23 98 
Improve the 
citizens identi-
fication with 
the municipali-
ty  
25 
(33) 
23 
(30) 
24 
(31) 
5 
(7) 
0 77 21 98 
Recruit the best 
employees  
16 
(21) 
28 
(36) 
24 
(31) 
8 
(10) 
1 
(1) 
77 21 98 
Improve the 
reputation of 
the municipali-
ty held by the 
employees  
10 
(13) 
22 
(29) 
32 
(42) 
12 
(16) 
1 
(1) 
77 21 98 
Prepare the 
municipality for 
potential crisis 
7 
(10) 
14 
(19) 
24 
(32) 
20 
(27) 
9 
(12) 
74 24 98 
Improve the 
citizens’ trust in 
the local politi-
cians  
4 
(5) 
15 
(20) 
32 
(43) 
17 
(23) 
7 
(9) 
75 23 98 
Insulate the 
municipality’s 
autonomy from 
central gov-
ernment inter-
ference  
4 
(6) 
10 
(14) 
22 
(31) 
17 
(24) 
18 
(25) 
71 27 98 
Improve the 
citizens’ trust in 
the public 
officials  
2 
(3) 
11 
(15) 
30 
(40) 
22 
(29) 
11 
(15) 
76 22 98 
* Number of respondents 
** Valid percent 
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Table 5. Central elements in the crisis communication strategies 
 To a 
very 
high 
degree  
To a 
high 
degree 
To 
some 
degree  
To a 
low 
degree  
To a 
very 
low 
de-
gree  
Total Miss
-ing 
Total  
The 
Safety of 
the citi-
zens 
22* 
(44)** 
14 
(28) 
9 
(18) 
3 
(6) 
2 
(4) 
50 48 98 
The 
Munici-
pality’s 
Reputa-
tion 
6 
(12) 
17 
(34) 
14 
(28) 
8 
(16) 
5 
(10) 
50 48 
 
98 
* Number of respondents 
** Valid % 
 
Table 4 reflects that preparing the municipalities for potential crises is not a 
central element in most municipal reputation strategies. Rather, according to the 
respondents, reputation management is a managerial instrument used for either 
increasing the population or developing more “traditional” purposes, such as 
“employer branding” and improving the reputation among central stakeholders. 
Furthermore, as reflected in Table 5, the crisis communication strategies are 
oriented more towards the safety of the citizens than the reputation of the munic-
ipality. The survey findings thus indicate that the strategies do not substantially 
reflect any formal and/or potential cognitive institutional integration and cou-
pling of crisis and reputation strategies and concerns. 
Regarding the type of stakeholders to whom the municipalities find it im-
portant to communicate in their reputation and crisis communication strategies, 
we expected the media to play a central role, both as a platform from which 
stakeholders perceive the information upon which they base their perceptions of 
the organization in “normal times” as well as during crises. However, although 
the media is considered an important stakeholder, citizens and the local business 
community are considered more important in relation to reputation strategies 
(Table 6), whereas the media and the citizens are considered almost equally 
important in relation to crisis communication strategies (Table 7) according to 
the survey respondents. 
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Table 6. Importance of stakeholders in reputation strategies 
 To a 
very 
high 
degree  
To a 
high 
de-
gree 
To 
some 
de-
gree  
To a 
low 
de-
gree  
To a 
very 
low 
de-
gree  
To-
tal 
Miss
-ing 
To
-tal  
The citi-
zens  
28* 
(47)** 
18 
(30) 
13 
(22) 
1 
(2) 
 60 38 98 
The local 
business 
community  
26 
(43) 
19 
(32) 
14 
(23) 
0 1 
(2) 
60 38 98 
The media  19 
(32) 
24 
(40) 
11 
(18) 
2 
(3) 
4 
(7) 
60 38 98 
Tourists 14 
(23) 
18 
(30) 
13 
(22) 
6 
(10) 
9 
(15) 
60 38 98 
The em-
ployees  
9 
(15) 
14 
(23) 
27 
(45) 
8 
(13) 
2 
(3) 
60 38 98 
Users of 
welfare 
services 
produced 
by the 
munici-
pality  
8 
(13) 
23 
(38) 
21 
(35) 
6 
(10) 
2 
(3) 
60 38 98 
The par-
liament  
2 
(3) 
9 
(15) 
21 
(35) 
13 
(22) 
15 
(25) 
60 38 98 
Other 
munici-
palities  
2 
(3) 
8 
(13) 
24 
(40) 
13 
(22) 
13 
(22) 
60 38 98 
The politi-
cal parties  
2 
(3) 
5 
(9) 
14 
(24) 
20 
(34) 
18 
(31) 
59 39 98 
Local 
Govern-
ment 
Denmark 
(LGDK2) 
1 
(2) 
6 
(10) 
19 
(32) 
17 
(29) 
16 
(27) 
59 39 98 
* Number of respondents 
** Valid percent 
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Table 7. Importance of stakeholders in crisis communication strategies 
 To a 
very 
high 
de-
gree  
To a 
high 
de-
gree 
To 
some 
de-
gree  
To a 
low 
de-
gree  
To a 
very 
low 
de-
gree  
Total Miss-
ing 
Total  
The 
citi-
zens 
18 
(35) 
29 
(57) 
3 
(6) 
0 1 
(2) 
51 47 98 
The 
media 
17 
(33) 
28 
(55) 
5 
(10) 
0 1 
(2) 
51 47 98 
The 
politi-
ti-
cians 
14 
(28) 
19 
(37) 
12 
(24) 
3 
(6) 
3 
(6) 
51 47 98 
* Number of respondents 
** Valid percent 
 
Turning to the third research question, we find no relationship between whether 
the municipalities that find it important to prepare for potential crises as part of 
their reputational strategies and whether they have formulated a crisis communi-
cation strategy (table not shown). Hence, although the municipalities are aware 
of the importance of crisis management to reduce the reputational costs associat-
ed with such a crisis, they are not necessarily more inclined to develop a formal 
crisis communication plan. 
The analysis of the type of crisis management reflected in the communica-
tion strategies reveals the degree to which we find a process-oriented manage-
ment approach. This may be reflected both in terms of the degree to which the 
individual strategies, including the dimensions we suggested, reflect such a crisis 
management approach as well as the degree to which the individual dimensions 
are reflected across the strategies. 
Turning to the former, Table 8 reflects the degree of process orientation of 
the individual strategies, calculated as the number of (the ten possible) dimen-
sions of a process orientation in each individual strategy.  
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Table 8. Degree of process orientation of the crisis management as reflected in 
the individual crisis communication plans 
Number of strategies including: 
1 dimension 1 (Municipality 18) 
2 dimensions 5 (Municipality 1, 8, 9, 13, 17) 
3 dimensions 7 (Municipality 2, 4, 7, 10, 20, 21, 
22) 
4 dimensions 1 (Municipality 14) 
5 dimensions 7 (Municipality 3, 5, 11, 12, 15, 19, 
23) 
6 dimensions 2 (Municipality 6, 16) 
7 dimensions 0 
8 dimensions 0 
9 dimensions 0 
10 dimensions 0 
Total 23 
 
The analysis of the degree to which the individual dimensions are reflected 
across the strategies is presented in Table 9. 
A first general finding reflected in Table 9 is that all of the aspects of a pro-
cess orientation towards crisis management are represented to a moderate degree 
in the sample of plans. Dimensions reflecting a strategic approach, recognition of 
phases in the crisis process, recognition of the dynamic character of a crisis, and 
the perception of crisis as either likely or predictable, are reflected in the plans. 
Whereas descriptions of a temporary crisis staff function (dimension 4) are 
part of almost all of the plans, this is only the case for around one third of the 
municipalities with respect to the recognition of the importance of evaluation 
and learning after a crisis (dimension 6), the importance of stakeholder analysis 
(dimension 3), specific crisis communication strategies (dimension 5) and the 
importance of monitoring during a crisis (dimension 7). Regarding important 
stakeholders, as reflected in the survey, the media and citizens are the stakehold-
ers mentioned most frequently in the strategies. The special role played by the 
media is reflected in the quotes below. 
 
Municipality X is of interest for the environment and mentioned in 
many media. In practice, the role of the press is often to control how 
the municipality acts as a public authority and the standards of the 
services produced by the municipality. From time to time, critical 
events or negative stories will occur. It is important that they are dealt 
with quickly and in an effective manner towards the press (p. 2). Mu-
nicipality 15 
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Table 9. Degree to which the individual dimensions of a process approach to 
crisis management is reflected in the crisis communication strategies 
Type of dimension Number of strategies 
including this dimen-
sion 
Dimensions reflect-
ing a strategic 
approach 
1. The strategy is explicit-
ly related to other munici-
pal strategies, goals 
and/or visions 
13 (Municipality 1, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 
16, 19, 20) 
Recognition of 
phases in the pro-
cess of a crisis 
2. The strategy includes a 
risk assessment 
4 (Municipality 6, 10, 
15, 23) 
3. The strategy includes a 
stakeholder analysis 
8 (Municipality 5, 6, 
10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 23) 
4. The strategy includes 
description  of a crisis 
staff, coordination of who 
should be involved how, 
and reflections on com-
munication 
21 (Municipality 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 20, 21, 23) 
5. The strategy includes a 
specific crisis communi-
cation strategy 
8 (Municipality 2: 6, 9, 
11, 12, 14, 16, 19) 
6. The strategy includes 
reflections on the im-
portance of evaluation and 
learning after the crisis 
10 (Municipality 3, 5, 
6, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 
22, 23) 
Recognition of the 
dynamic character 
of crisis 
7. The strategy recognizes 
that monitoring during a 
crisis is important 
8 (Municipality 2, 3, 4, 
5, 7, 9, 12, 21) 
8. The strategy recognizes 
the importance of dia-
logue with multiple stake-
holders 
1 (Municipality 22) 
9. The strategy describes a 
portfolio of scenarios 
2 (Municipality 11, 16)  
Perception of crisis 10 Perception of crisis to 
be likely/predictable 
9 (Municipality 3, 11, 
14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 
23) 
 
The press and media are important to us. This is where much of the 
day-to-day dialogue with the citizens, the business community and 
other stakeholders is performed. At the same time, the press contrib-
utes to linking the image of Municipality X to the environment. The 
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media affects how we as employees perceive our organization and 
how the citizens and the business community perceive the municipal-
ity (p. 2). Municipality 19 
 
The quote below shows that monitoring during the crisis largely means monitor-
ing the media. 
 
The crisis communication team monitors the media during the crisis. 
The team informs the chairman for the coordinating steering commit-
tee or the crisis management informed about the current media situa-
tion (p. 5). Municipality 12 
 
The fact that crises are likely and predictable is a part of nine of the strategies. 
Qualitative examples of this dimension are reflected in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Qualitative examples of descriptions of crises as likely and predictable 
in crisis communication plans 
Can crisis be predicted? Crisis can occur in two ways: the sud-
den and the smoldering crises. The sudden crisis arises without 
a warning and will usually generate substantial media cover-
age. This type of crisis can’t be planned and always occurs in-
conveniently, e.g. Friday afternoon, when you’re off for the 
holidays. Conversely, the smoldering crisis sneaks up on you 
and has been growing for a while before breaking out. They are 
often serious problems, which have either been overlooked (ig-
nored) or to which nobody has paid any attention. If—or 
when—the problem captures the attention of the public, it will 
often cause negative press coverage, and the solution to the 
problem can involve large, non-budgeted expenses (p. 3). M 2 
This handbook sharpens our attention regarding critical issues, 
signals and good crisis management (p. 2). M11 
Nobody knows for sure when difficult situations and crises 
arise. But they rarely come as a surprise. It is often possible to 
predict most of the difficult situations (p. 5). M 14 
Municipality X is of interest for the environment and is men-
tioned in many media. In practice, the role of the press is often 
to control how the municipality acts as a public authority and 
the standards of the services produced by the municipality. 
From time to time, critical events or negative stories will occur. 
It is important that they are dealt with quickly and in an effec-
tive manner towards the press (p. 2). M 15 
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Like all other municipalities, Municipality X occasionally ex-
periences issues/cases that are subject to negative media cover-
age and threaten the reputation or values of the municipality (p. 
1). M16 
Municipality X is a large corporation with a diverse portfolio. 
Therefore, it happens that we make mistakes or unexpected cri-
ses and accidents occur that affect the employees, the citizens 
or in some other ways are of public interest (p. 9). M 19 
‘The best way to manage a crisis is to prevent it' (Coombs, 
1999:7)…Like issues that have become a crisis, it’s important 
to pay attention to a potential crisis; that is, problems that have 
not yet become known to the public but which may quickly de-
velop into a crisis (p. 6). M 20 
Crises are unavoidable…crises can often be predicted—pay at-
tention to the signals (p. 1). M 22 
A media crisis is an unexpected situation which threatens an 
organization’s reputation, image or legitimacy fundamentally 
(p. 6). M 23 
 
Regarding the dimension reflecting how the strategy is explicitly related to other 
municipal strategies, goals or visions (dimension 1 in Table 9), we find that of 
the thirteen strategies, only seven explicitly refer to the reputational aspects of 
the municipality, eleven explicitly refer to reputation as a central concern and 
reason for engaging in crisis communication. Table 11 provides the qualitative 
descriptions of reputational concerns in the 11 municipalities. 
 
Table 11. Qualitative examples of reputational concerns in crisis communication 
strategies 
In this context, a crisis is defined as an important issue capable 
of endangering the reputation and credibility of Municipality 
X. That is, a reputational crisis, a media crisis or a communica-
tion crisis (p. 9). M 1 
A crisis is a serious event affecting human safety, the environ-
ment, products, services, and/or the reputation of the munici-
pality and a disruption of (parts of) the municipality’s opera-
tion. And which therefore has or may risk receiving intensive 
media coverage (p. 3). M 3 
We define a crisis as a serious event that affects the citizen 
safety and the environment, production, services and/or reputa-
tion of the municipality (p. 3). M 4 
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A crisis is an unexpected event or issue that threatens the ex-
pectations stakeholders have to the organization or which may 
have serious consequences for the organization’s self-
perception/performance and generate negative coverage (p. 1). 
M 5 
A crisis is a sudden event or situation that develops quickly, 
demands immediate reaction, generates stress and insecurity, 
and threatens the reputation of the municipality, its relations, 
operation or—in the worst case—its citizens (p. 2). M 6 
A crisis can be defined as an unexpected, unpredictable event, 
which may have a negative effect on the organization of the 
municipality and its reputation in relation to different stake-
holders (e.g. politicians, employees, citizens, media) if it is 
handled incorrectly [italics in the original] (p. 2). M 7 
Crisis communication is relevant, when an unforeseen event or 
issue, which expectedly will attack a significant political or 
media attention, threatens the business or the image of the mu-
nicipality (p.6). M 8 
A crisis is an unexpected situation that fundamentally threatens 
the municipality’s reputation, image and legitimacy. The crisis 
unfolds in the media when an issue is mentioned repeatedly. 
Criticism in the media is not necessarily a crisis, but poorly 
handled criticism can become a crisis. Source: KL’s Kriseguide 
2008 (p. 2). M 15 
Like all other municipalities, Municipality X occasionally ex-
periences issues/cases that are subject to negative media cover-
age and threaten the reputation or values of the municipality (p. 
1). M 16 
…a crisis is an unexpected situation, which threatens the citi-
zens, the municipal employees or the reputation, image and le-
gitimacy of the municipality in a fundamental way (p. 9). M19 
A media crisis is an unexpected situation that fundamentally 
threatens an organization’s reputation, image or legitimacy (p. 
6). M 20 
 
Further indication of the reputational concerns reflected within the crisis com-
munication plans are reflected by the fact that 14 municipalities provide exam-
ples of crises in their plans. Nine of them mention reputational crisis and/or 
negative media coverage as examples. Summing up: around half of the crisis 
communication plans explicitly refer to crisis as having a reputational dimen-
sion; and in most of the qualitative descriptions presented in Table 11, crises are 
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largely defined as threats to reputation and legitimacy. More than is the case for 
the reputational strategies, we find a coupling of reputation and crisis concerns in 
the crisis communication plans, which reflects a formal—and to some extent 
cognitive—institutionalized awareness of the intimate relationship between 
reputation and crisis. 
The final research questions asked: In the municipalities where preparation 
for a potential crisis is a central element in the reputational strategy, what type of 
identity and reputational dimension is central to the reputational strategy? Based 
on gamma tests, we find a positive and moderate-to-substantial relationship 
between preparing the municipalities for potential crises and 1) improving the 
reputation of the municipality held by important stakeholders in the municipality 
(Gamma = 0.353; p < 0.01); 2) improving the reputation of the municipality held 
by the employees (Gamma = 0.501; p < 0.013); 3) recruiting the best employees 
(Gamma = 0.328; p < 0.01); and 4) improving the citizens’ identification with 
the municipality (Gamma = 0.409; p < 0.01) (tables not shown).4 These relation-
ships suggest a moderate-to-strong relationship between preparing the munici-
palities for potential crises and elements reflecting generic elements of reputa-
tional management relevant for both private and public organizations, namely 
targeting reputational efforts to important stakeholders as well as a tool for en-
suring the recruitment of the best employees. These elements reflect performa-
tive and technical reputational dimensions, which we have argued are affiliated 
with a corporate identity. 
Furthermore, we find positive and very strong relationships between prepar-
ing the municipalities for potential crises and 1) improving citizen trust in the 
local politicians (Gamma = 0.614; p < 0.01); 2) improving the citizen trust in the 
civil servants in the local administration (Gamma = 0.645; p < 0.01), and 3) 
insulating the autonomy of the municipality from central government interfer-
ence (Gamma = 0.582; p < 0.01) (tables not shown). These findings suggest that 
a very strong relationship exists between preparing the municipalities for poten-
tial crises and elements reflecting elements specific to public sector organiza-
tions, namely, ensuring trust in order to be able to act as a legitimate political 
actor and ensuring autonomy in order to safeguard the local democracy. Such 
elements reflect a moral reputational dimension, which we have argued is of 
vital importance for the local democracy aspect of the municipalities’ multiple-
identity profiles. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Framed in an institutional perspective, this article has investigated a process of 
complex institutionalization. This ambition has been addressed as an investiga-
tion of whether the emerging awareness of reputation and crisis concerns within 
the organizational field of Danish municipalities leads to a coupling or decou-
pling between reputation and crisis management within the municipal organiza-
tions. Based upon the analysis of a number of more operational research ques-
tions, however, the conclusion is rather ambiguous. 
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Examining the crisis communication strategies and analyzing the survey an-
swers regarding crisis and reputation management by the persons responsible for 
strategic communication and the CAOs, we conclude that the normative ideas 
regarding the strategic management of reputation and crisis have been institu-
tionalized in most Danish municipalities. Hence, a first conclusion is that reputa-
tion and crisis management per se have been disseminated widely among the 
Danish municipalities. The qualitative analysis reveals that reputational ideas are 
an aspect of crisis management (for a similar conclusion, see Frandsen & Johan-
sen, 2009: 113) and vice versa. However, the degree to which crisis is a central 
element of reputational strategies and reputation to crisis ditto is relatively low. 
Furthermore, in the municipalities that recognize preparing for crisis to be a 
central element of reputational strategic management, this is not significantly 
related to the formulation of crisis communication plans. 
The qualitative analysis of the crisis plans reveals a somewhat stronger de-
gree of coupling between reputational aspects with the crisis management. Alt-
hough the plans only to a moderate degree reflect a proactive and process ap-
proach to crisis management, an awareness of the reputational implications of 
such crisis is evident in most crisis communication plans. Furthermore, almost 
half of the municipalities included in the analysis of the plans recognize that 
crises are likely, which may be a first (both cognitive and strategic) step towards 
a more process-oriented approach to crisis management and, hence, a more ap-
propriate approach for limiting reputational costs and damages before, during 
and after a crisis. 
How might we explain this relatively modest degree of coupling between 
two managerial practices, which represent the same logic and, hence, may be 
neither incompatible nor contradictory? One tentative explanation may be found 
in the field of Danish municipalities, which may be characterized not only as a 
very mature field, but also as a field or “relational space,” which is held together 
by field-level processes generated by LGDK. While merely representing a nor-
mative authority capable of generating normative and mimetic institutional pres-
sures upon the municipalities, their “enforcement mechanisms” (Greenwood et 
al., 2011: 339) are rather dominant and powerful within the field of Danish mu-
nicipalities. This is also the case for disseminating the ideas of performing repu-
tational and crisis management where LGDK generates normative pressures for 
engaging in such strategic communicative endeavors (Frandsen & Johansen, 
2013; Nielsen & Salomonsen, 2012). This is reflected by the relatively dominant 
perception of a crisis being a “media crisis” (e.g., also the dominant role the 
media plays in crisis communication strategies) and, as noted by Frandsen and 
Johansen (2009) in their analysis of the institutionalization of a crisis vis-à-vis an 
emergency logic in Danish municipalities, in how the strategies reflect that the 
definition of crisis prevalent in the field is largely inspired by LGDK’s percep-
tion of a crisis (Frandsen & Johansen, 2013: 183-184). In such a perspective, the 
institutionalization of crisis and reputation management reflects the institutional 
adoption—or institutional “acquiescence” (Pache & Santos, 2010: 462)—and 
compliance to two normative institutional ideas largely generated by LGDK 
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rather than potential strategic and reflexive responses to perceived challenges 
and/or changes in the environments of the Danish municipalities. 
Another tentative explanation of the relatively modest integration may be 
time, as both crisis and reputation management—although widely diffused—
represent rather new managerial practices within the Danish municipalities. 
Although modestly coupled, the analysis reveals that crisis and reputation 
management per se is widely disseminated among the municipalities. In addition 
to the normative enforcement generated by LGDK, a number of other contextual 
factors possibly add to the explanation. First, the radical reform reducing the 
number of municipalities generated attention concerning municipal identity and 
reputation as well as the potential “crisis” and substantial (negative) reactions 
from the environments involved in large mergers and other types of changes 
(Frandsen & Johansen, 2009: 102; Nielsen & Salomonsen, 2012: 58-60). Fur-
thermore, contemporary society is generally more occupied with risks and crises. 
Although modest, the coupling indicates that the normative ideas represent-
ed by reputation and crisis management can potentially grow stronger coupled 
rather than internally decoupled within the Danish municipalities. This may be 
further supported by the fact, that although representing different ideas, reputa-
tional and crisis management are expectedly “represented” and “given voice” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011: 348; Pache & Santos, 2010: 460-461) by the same type 
of actors within the municipalities, namely the apex of the administrative bu-
reaucracy and those responsible for and working professionally with strategic 
communication. Hence, although neither entirely institutionalized nor strongly 
coupled within the field of Danish municipalities, we expect that reputational 
and crisis management concerns may live less separate lives in the future. 
From a theoretical perspective, the ideas behind reputation and crisis man-
agement are in fact intimately related and deserve close integration. Increasingly 
integrating reputation concerns and crisis management is therefore vital, as crises 
pose severe threats to the organizational reputation. “A crisis poses a threat to 
reputational assets [...] As greater emphasis is placed on reputation, a corre-
sponding emphasis must be placed on crisis management as a means of protect-
ing reputational assets” (Coombs, 2015: 13). Further research has documented 
how crisis response strategies are “likely” to have an affect on the reputation of 
the organization after a crisis (Coombs, 2012: 273). 
Reputational concerns have been a central element in crisis communication 
research since its infancy (Coombs, 2012: 263). First, crisis response strategies 
have been seen as tools for protecting or repairing corporate reputations, as such 
strategies aim at affecting the perception of the organizational stakeholders (Be-
noit, 1995). Second, the Situational Crisis Communication Theory developed by 
Coombs points out the importance of an organization’s prior reputation for the 
“symbolic costs” of a crisis (Coombs, 2012: 269). That is, previously having a 
negative reputation may influence the degree to which stakeholders ascribe re-
sponsibility for a crisis to an organization. Based on the crisis management liter-
ature, we may therefore argue that coupling reputation and crisis management is 
crucial—and from a strategic point of view preferable—for municipalities. 
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The theoretical arguments for the importance of integrating and coupling 
concerns of relevance to reputation and crisis management can, however, not 
only be based on the perspective of the individual municipalities and the costs 
involved in reputational damages, but can also be based on the perspective from 
the field of municipalities. As argued by Wæraas (forthcoming), municipalities 
are placed within a “reputational commons” when sharing the reputation as-
cribed to the entire municipal sector (Barnett, 2006; King, Lenox & Barnett, 
2002; Barnett & King, 2008). Hence, the “symbolic costs” of a crisis in one 
municipality may also “rub off” on municipalities in general. 
Furthermore, the conclusion can be contextualized within the research on 
reputation management in the public sector. According to Wæraas and Maor 
(forthcoming), this research has been conducted from two different perspec-
tives—political science and organization theory—the focus being on two rather 
different rationales for the strategic reputational efforts of public organizations. 
Based on agencies primarily found in central government, the political science 
perspective emphasizes how a favorable reputation possibly serves as a political 
asset for public organizations insomuch as it can be used to ensure public sup-
port as well as “achieve delegated autonomy and discretion from politicians” 
(Carpenter, 2002: 491), insulating the organization from “political attacks” from 
their political principals. From this perspective, reputational concerns are based 
on agencies that are seen as rational political actors. 
Research from the organizational perspective is primarily based on the local 
levels of the public sector. Here, there is a tendency to emphasize how a favora-
ble reputation in municipalities, the health sector, etc. may increase the popula-
tion (more taxpaying citizens), aid the recruitment of the best employees, and 
attract business investors (Byrkjeflot, Salomonsen & Wæraas, 2013: 149-150; 
Luoma-aho, 2007: 124). This perspective is based on the idea that public organi-
zations increasingly identify themselves as an organization in search of a strong-
er reputation and applying reputation management as a universal “organizational 
recipe” ready to be implemented in any context (Wæraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012). 
From this perspective, the idea of the public organization as an organization has 
become an institution per se (Røvik, 2007: 66), and behavior within such organi-
zations is seen as resulting from a process of institutionalization rather than ra-
tional calculations on how to maximize bureaucratic discretion and autonomy. 
From this perspective, our study contributes to the organizational perspective on 
public sector reputation, which has thus far emphasized the symbolic manage-
ment of reputation (Wæraas & Maor, forthcoming), as it goes beyond the sym-
bolic management of reputational aspects. In line with this ambition, we have 
demonstrated how central municipal actors prioritize different elements when 
describing their reputational managerial practices. We have also investigated the 
degree to which the formal strategic documents reflect any indication of a cogni-
tive awareness of the need to integrate the strategic efforts of reputation and 
crisis management. By investigating strategies, however, one might argue that 
we are indeed engaged in the analysis of the symbolic aspects of the Danish 
municipalities. Although acknowledging this, we also point out the importance 
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of not merely emphasizing a decoupling between the “substantial” and “symbol-
ic” aspects of organizational behavior (Wæraas, Byrkjeflot & Angell, 2011), 
since intended ceremonial practices may, over time, “take over” the organization 
(Greenwood et al., 2011: 350) after a certain “incubation” time, as suggested by 
Røvik (2007: 361). Further, the formulation of a strategy or vision for handling 
crises (as reputational threats) is critical for ensuring the coordination and cou-
pling between e.g. reputational and crisis concerns within the municipal organi-
zation (Maor 2010: 966). Hence, although strategies indeed primarily reflect 
“organizational talk,” such talk is to be considered as “action taken within the 
social order of an organization” (Czarniawska-Joerges & Joerges, 1988: 173), 
representing a linking mechanism between the symbolic aspects of an organiza-
tion and organizational practices (Czarniawska-Joerges & Joerges, 1988: 173). 
We therefore argue that the management of the symbolic aspects of an organiza-
tion may be as much about managing the organizational reality as being about 
the symbolic management of environmental relations and reputational dimen-
sions. 
A central limitation of the analysis relates to the data. Although the data in-
clude both formal documents and survey data as well as quantitative and qualita-
tive analyses, the data is largely reflecting the perception of crisis and reputa-
tional management from the top of the administrative hierarchy and/or the core 
staff regarding strategic communication. This produces limitations regarding the 
external validity (generalizability) to other levels of the municipal organization, 
as the actors included in this analysis are more likely to be more “receptive” to 
the institutional pressure (Delmas & Toffel, 2008: 1032) for engaging in this 
type of strategic management as well as being more aware of their potentially 
intimate relation. 
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Appendix A: 
Codebook for identifying the degree to which the strategies reflect a  
process-based approach to crisis management: 
1: What is the name of the municipality? 
2: Is the crisis communication strategy 
1) part of a general communication strategy? 
2) a specific strategy for crisis communication? 
3: Which types of crisis are described? 
4: Dimensions in a process approach to crisis management 
4.1 Strategic approach 1 The strategy is explicitly related to other strategies, 
goals or visions of the municipality - if yes, which (e.g. 
democracy, reputation, emergency plan) 
4.2. Recognition of 
phases in the process 
The strategy includes: 
2 A risk assessment 
- a priori 
- described as a vital instrument during a crisis 
3 A stake holder analysis 
- a priori, and if so  
internal stakeholders 
external stakeholders 
both internal and external stakeholders 
- described as vital instrument during a crisis 
4 Crisis plan including description of a CMT, coordina-
tion of who should be involved and how, and some 
reflections on communication 
5 A specific crisis communication plan 
- internal 
- external 
- internal and external 
6 Reflections on the importance of evaluation and 
learning after the crisis 
4.3. Recognition of 
the dynamic character 
of crises 
7 Monitoring during crises is important 
8 Dialogue with multiple stakeholders is important 
9 Portfolio of scenarios 
- types of scenarios (e.g. internally or externally 
generated crisis) 
4.4 Crises are per-
ceived as: 
10 Crises are perceived as likely/predictable 
 
5. Which stakeholders 
are mentioned? 
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Notes 
 
1 This research was supported by a grant from The Research Council of Norway, DEMOSREG. 
Project “The challenges of building trust: Reputation and brand management in municipalities”. 
2 LGDK is the interest organization of Danish local governments. Membership of LGDK is volun-
tary, but it is presently organizing all 98 local governments. LGDK annually negotiates the overall 
financial frames of the local governments with the Danish Government. Furthermore, LGDK actively 
‘assists’ the local governments to accommodate the different types of challenges posed both to the 
local politicians and the local administration, including the CEO when implementing the policies 
decided by the national government as well as introducing new management ideas to local govern-
ments. As LGDK membership is strictly voluntary for the local governments, LGDK has no authori-
ty over local governments and cannot force them to do anything. However, LGDK can apply norma-
tive pressure upon local governments. 
3 Improving the reputation of the municipality held by the employees is just above 0.50 meaning that 
it is not only moderate to substantial, but substantial. 
4 There is no significant relation between preparing the municipalities for potential crises and increa-
sing the population of the municipality as central elements of the reputational strategy. 
